Afghanistan: Rethinking An Old Alliance
By Greg Reeson
February 17, 2009
The United States and its allies are in danger of losing the war in Afghanistan. A resurgent Taliban is in control of large parts of the country, the central government in Kabul is corrupt and incapable of exerting its authority beyond the capital, a flourishing drug trade is financing criminals, war lords, and terrorists, violence is spiraling out of control, and members of the U.S.-led coalition are growing weary of a stability operation-turned-full-fledged war that is eroding public opinion among the populations of Afghanistan, Europe, and the United States.
In the U.S., President Barack Obama has ordered a comprehensive strategic review of the American effort in Afghanistan, and has announced his intention to increase the number of American military forces in the country by as many as 30,000. That would bring the total U.S. commitment to about 65,000, around double the number provided by all other nations contributing assets to the fight against Taliban and al Qaeda militants. As the United States seeks a new way forward in Afghanistan, it should seriously consider leaving behind old alliances that are proving to be more of a hindrance than a help in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism. A good place to start is with NATO.
NATO was originally formed to defend Western Europe from the threat posed by an expansionist Soviet Union. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of America's rival superpower left the alliance without a common enemy, and in search of a new reason for its existence. That reason appeared to be made clear when al Qaeda terrorists struck the United States in New York and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001. NATO rallied to America's side and immediately invoked the collective defense article of its charter, affirming its founding principle that an attack against one member state was an attack against all. NATO's initial display of unified determination to confront radical Islamism, however, quickly gave way to a half-hearted effort in Afghanistan that has been held back by limited troop contributions and national caveats on the employment of those troops that ultimately has limited the ability of coalition commanders in the field to effectively fight the war.
Right now the United States has more than 30,000 troops committed to Afghanistan, while the next largest troop contributor, Great Britain, has less than 9,000. Other major allies, including Germany, France, Canada, The Netherlands, Australia and Italy, are contributing less than 3,000 each. President Obama promised during his campaign that he would ask the United States' NATO allies to increase their force contributions in Afghanistan, but their response thus far has been nothing short of disheartening. Great Britain announced plans to send 300 more soldiers, and Italy intends to send 800 more. France has said a small, non-combat element may be sent, and Australia, a non-NATO ally with roughly 1,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, is taking the allocation of additional troops under consideration. Germany immediately rejected the idea of sending more forces, a move quickly followed by Spain, and both The Netherlands and Canada are planning on withdrawing their contingents in 2010 and 2011, respectively.
>> Continued -- Page 1 2
| 
